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NOTES
THE FRED MEYER CASE AND SECTION 2(d) OF THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT'
THE RoOBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Chain Stores Are Out. There is No Place for Chain Stores in
the American Economic Picture.
2
There is a distinct note of irony in these words. Perhaps they
represent wishful thinking by one whose apparent hopes were
shattered; for, there can be no doubt about it, chain stores are in.
They play a central role in the modern economic picture.
Grocery chains developed rapidly following World War I.
3
The advantages to the consumer in the form of lower prices,
attributable to operational efficiencies, resulted in an increase in
their share of total retail sales from nine to twenty-five per cent
beween 1926 and 1933. 4 During this period, however, the general
distress of the Depression aroused public sentiment against all
forms of large scale enterprise, and the chain stores were a likely
scapegoat. By 1929 an organized attack had been launched against
the "chain store menace" in more than four hundred cities and
towns. 5 Propaganda campaigns by the news media fanned the
flames of discontent, 6 and the legislature responded with the
Robinson-Patman Act.
7
The Act was a product of a diseased economy and an
organized effort to preserve the traditional marketing system during
a time of revolutionary change.8 The legislative purpose was to
amend the inadequate Clayton Act 9 so as ". .. to curb and prohibit
all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences
over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power." 10
1F.T.C. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
2 Statement by Rep. Patman quoted in McNair, Marketing Functions &
the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 n.1 (1937).3F. RowE, PIuc DISCRIrNATION UiwzDE THE ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT
4 (1962).41d. at 5, citing J. PALAMOUNTAiN, THE POLITICS or DISTRhUTiox 7
(1955).
5J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE PouIcs OF DisTuBuToN 160 (1955).
6 Id. "Huey Long proclaimed he would rather have thieves and gang-
sters than chain stores in Louisiana." Quoted in Fulda, Food Distribution
in the United States, 99 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1051 (1951).7 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).8 F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE RoBrNsoN-PATmAN ACT
3 (1962).
9Id. at 6.
10 F.T.C. v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960).
NOTES
The language of the Act is inconsistent and ambiguous, 1
remaining a legal enigma to the present day. 2 Moreover, the
cases interpreting it have served to increase the confusion and dis-
crepancies. A primary example is the recent Fred Meyer case, 13
which could possibly be the most significant case since 1936 which
patently displays the shortcomings of Robinson-Patman. Although
the case is concerned both with sections 2(a) and 2(d) of the Act,
the import of the decision rests with its construction. of 2(d), to
which this note is primarily devoted.
SECTION 2(d) OF THE ACT
It was obvious to the legislature in 1936 that provisions would
have to be incorporated in the new amendment which would "...
scotch evasions of the Clayton Act's ban on price discrimination
by subterfuge arrangements which cloaked discriminatory favorit-
ism to large buyers in the garb of cooperative promotional
arrangements." ' 4 Thus section 2(d) was aimed at promotional
allowances which had the effect of price adjustments.' 5 Curiously,
however, although the section was specifically intended to deter
large buyers from using their economically advantageous positions
to secure special allowances,' 6 there is no mention of "buyers" in
the language employed. Rather, the incidence of the legislation
primarily befalls the seller.1
" See, e.g., C. EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DIscRIMINAToN LAW 154-56
(1959) ; Alexander, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act:
A Dens Ex, Machina in the Trade Interpretation of the Robinson-Patinan
Act, 12 SYRACUSE L. Rsv. 317, 318-20 (1961); Rowe, Price Discrimination,
Competition and Confitsion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE
L.J. 929, 941 n.66 (1951).
12Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty
Year Perspective, 57 CoLuII. L. Ray. 1059 (1957).
13 F.T.C. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
14 C. EDWaRDs, TE, PRICz DiscimINAr o N LAW 365 (1959); see, e.g.,
General Foods Corn., 52 F.T.C. 798, 822 (1956) ; Krug v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D.N.J. 1956). The purpose of section
2(d) was explained by Representative Utterback, Chairman of the Senate-
House Conferees thusly:
The existing evil at which this part of the bill [2(d)] is aimed
is, of course, the grant of discrimination under the guise of payments
for advertising and promotional services, which, whether or not the
services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an advantage to the
customer so favored as compared with others who have to bear the
cost of such services themselves. . . . 80 CONG. Rac. 9418 (1936).
15 S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
16R.H. Macy & Co. v. F.T.C., 326 F.2d 445, 447 (24 Cir. 1964);
American News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F2d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 824 (1962).
17 See C. ExwARns, THE PaicE DIscRIMINATioN LAW, ch. 15 (1959).
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Making Allowances Available
Section 2(d) requires that promotional allowances be made
"...available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers
competing in the distribution of such products or commodities." I
The means by which payments or allowances for advertising were
to be "made available" was and remains unclear. Some early
cases required that suppliers make "affirmative and specific notifica-
tion" to all customers that certain payments or allowances were
being made available. 19 The FTC's 1960 Guides for Advertising
Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services per-
mit a more general notification in the way of publicity sufficient to
allow all types of competing customers to participate.20 In the
Vanity Fair case 21 the Second Circuit quoted the requirement
specified in the Guides:
The seller should take some action to inform all his customers com-
peting with any participating customer that the plan is available. He
can do this by any means he chooses, including letter, telegram, notice
on invoices, salesmen, brokers, etc. However, if a seller wants to be
able to show later that he did make an offer to a certain customer, he
is in a better position to do so if he made it in writing.22
Proportionalizing Under 2(d)
The requirement of "proportionality" has been described by
Mr. Frederick M. Rowe as "provocatively vague." 23 There is no
18 Robinson-Patnmn Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (d) (1964). Section 2(d) pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay
or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit
of a customer of such person in the course of such commerce as com-
pensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by
or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling,
sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufac-
tured, sold, or offered for sale by such person unless such payment
or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or com-
modities.
19See, e.g., Chestnut Farms Chevy Chase Dairy, 53 F.T.C. 1050, 1060
(1957); Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1532, 1548 (1956); Kay Windsor
Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 95 (1954).
20 F.T.C. 1960 Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandis-
ing Payments and Services, 1 CCH TRADE REG. Rm'. 607Z (Hereinafter
cited as GumEs). See also D. BAUM, THE R OBINSON-PATMAN Acr 60
(1964); F. RowE, Paics DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE RoBnsON-PATMAN
AcT 400 (1962).2 LVanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. F.T.C., 311 F2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962).
22 Id. at 485.
23 F. RowE, PRicE DiscImiNATioN UNDER THE RoBINSoN-PATmAN Acv
370 (1962).
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formula set forth in the statute whereby one can determine how to
proportionalize. According to the approach taken in the Soap
cases,24 approved by the Supreme Court in Simplicity Pattern,25 and
subsequently endorsed in the 1960 Guides,26 the legality of promo-
tional allowances or payments is determined on the basis of (1) the
relationship between the payments and the volume of purchases
and (2) the actual value to the supplier of the promotional con-
tribution.2 7 To understand the value of these criteria it is necessary
to analyze the problem. Simply, it will sometimes be desirable
to grant an allowance to a large customer while it may not be at
all feasible to grant any allowance, even on proportional terms, to
his smaller competitor. For example, where a substantial payment
or allowance for advertising is made available by a supplier to a
large chain store, the expenditure may provide for a newspaper,
radio or television advertisement of significant value to the supplier.
On the other hand, an allowance to a single retail grocer pro-
portionally based on his volume of purchases might be sufficient
merely for a window poster, obviously of relatively little value to
the supplier. However, based on the value of the promotional
contribution to the supplier, the grocer would probably be entitled
to no allowance.- Herein lies the value of criteria which weigh
both important factors: volume of purchases and value of the con-
tribution. Thus, such a formula is both workable and desirable
in that it takes into account the economic subtleties which are
overlooked in many other areas.
Defining "Competing Customer"
Having arrived at a somewhat satisfactory formula for the
proportionality clause we must turn to a much more thorny
question-one that appears to be the Achilles heel of the section-
What is a competing customer?
The Guides define "customer" as "...someone who buys
directly from the seller or his agent or broker .... ", 29 The Com-
mission thus formally established its position earlier expressed in
24 Lever Bros. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., Colgate-Palmolive-
Peet Co., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953).
25 F.T.C. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
26 Guwrs.
27 Hickey, The Fred Meyer Case-Its Implications Under Section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patntan Act, 9 ANTnusT Bin.. 255, 266 (1964).
28 Where a competitor can furnish the services in less quantity, but of
the same relative value, he seems entitled, and this clause is designed to
accord him, the right to a similar allowance commensurate with those
facilities. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936); H.R. REP.
No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936).
29 GurDEs.
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the Atlanta Trading case 30 and contrary to the district court's
decision in the Krug case.31 There had to be some privity between
the two parties unless circumstances existed calling for the invoca-
tion of the so-called "indirect purchaser" doctrine.32
Originally, parties were considered competing customers only
if they were on the same functional level (i.e., wholesalers,
retailers). It was realized, however, that labels could be deceiving
since a supplier could arbitrarily classify its customers irrespective
of true functional differences. Thus, in the Ruberoid case 33 the
Commission disregarded what it considered ambiguous labels and
phrased its order in terms of "purchasers who in fact compete."
The Supreme Court felt that approach to be unobjectionable.
Here again we run into another problem. Customers with a
multiproduct line may compete with respect to many products,
but this does not necessarily mean they compete with respect to
the distribution of the product bought from a particular supplier
(e.g., where they distribute that product in different geographical
areas). Thus, a national chain store may purchase a product
from the same supplier as a small retail grocer. The chain store
may have an outlet in the same locality as the grocer and the two
are actual competitors, but the chain does not sell the product
purchased from the common supplier in that locality. Are they
competing customers? The Commission says no. In its Ligget &
Meyers ruling it stated that, "[t]he proportional equality required
by Section 2(d) relates to customers competing in the distribution
of the products involved.... ,, 34
Rowe would base an identification of competing customers on
a finding of geographic and functional competition.3 Alternatively,
Mr. Daniel J. Baum considers these criteria to be too narrow and
favors a simple determination of whether or not competition is
actually affected by the grant of an allowance or service to one
customer and not to another.36 The latter's criticism of the former
as being too narrow seems unwarranted; rather, the latter's premise
might be too broad. It is difficult to see how a precise determina-
3OAtlanta Trading Corp. v. F.T.C., 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
31 Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D.N.J.
1956) held that a "[v]iolation of Section 3(d) may occur when a manu-
facturer gives a retailer an allowance not given to a wholesaler whose
customers compete with such retailer."
32 This doctrine is discussed fully infra.
33 F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
34Ligget & Meyers Tobacco Co., No. 6642 (F.T.C., Sept. 9, 1959);
F. ROWE, PRIcE DIscRIMINATION UNDER THE RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT 397
(1962).
35F. RowE, PRIcE DIscRIMINATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSoN-PATMAN AcT
394 (1962).
36D. BAUm, THE RoaINSON-PATMAx AcT 54 (1964).
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tion can be made as to whether two parties are competing when
the only criterion used is the effect of the allowance upon
competition.
Although a supplier need only make his allowances available
to competing customers, there are situations where an indirect-
buying competitor of a direct-buying customer is also considered
eligible for the allowances or payments. Such a situation arises
where there is a "course of direct dealing" between the supplier
and indirect-buying retailer, and control by the supplier over the
terms of the ensuing purchase transaction.37
The rule was first set forth in Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.,33
where the Commission stated:
A retailer is none the less a purchaser because he buys indirectly if,
as here, the manufacturer deals with him directly in promoting the
sale of his products and exercises control over the terms upon which
he buys.
3 0
The basic rationale in all "indirect purchaser" doctrine situa-
tions is that the exertion of control or the direct dealing between
the supplier and the indirect-buying retailer relegates the function
of the wholesaler or distributor to that of a "mere conduit" for the
supplier's products.40  Consequently, the indirect purchaser who is
in competition with the direct purchaser is as much a "customer"
as if he had in fact purchased directly and had no dealings with the
distributor. Alternatively, if there were no "course of direct deal-
ing" or control there would be no substantial relationship between
the parties, they being only remotely linked in the distributive
chain.41  To hold a purchaser in such a situation to be a "customer"
wvould contravene the "Colgate Doctrine." 42
37 American News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824 (1962); KS. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89 (1954); Kraft-
Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
3s25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). Here the Commission was dealing with an
alleged 2(a) violation by a respondent who manufactured and distributed
cheese products. Most retailers did not buy directly, but the Commission
found that respondent exercised a control over the distributing channels
through which its products moved.
30 Id. at 546.
40 Hickey, The Fred Meyer Case-Its Implications Under Section 2(d)
of the Robznson-Patmnan Act, 9 ANTrrUST BuLL. 255, 268 (1964).
4'See, e.g., Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (1956), where the
court refused to hold that an indirect-buying retailer was a "customer"
because there were no direct dealings between the manufacturers and retailer
nor any measure of control by the former over the latter. See also Ameri-
can News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
824 (1962).42 The essence of the doctrine is the right to select customers and to
NOTES1968 ]
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The "indirect purchaser" doctrine is essential for the achieve-
ment of the legislative objectives. 3 If the requirement that pro-
tection only be afforded to those actually purchasing directly from
the supplier were rigidly adhered to, suppliers could avoid giving
proportional allowances to competitors of their direct-buying
favored retailers by utilizing "dummy" wholesalers.44
It is readily apparent that a delicate balance has been estab-
lished so as to give some continuity to the inconsistent provisions
of the Act while at the same time striving to achieve its ultimate
objective. The objective, though of dubious value, was always
within reach, but by a circuitous route. Today, that route is no
longer available, it having been diverted to a "dead end" by Fred
Meyer.45
THE FRED MEYER CASE
Fred Meyer, Inc. operates a sizable supermarket chain in the
Portland, Oregon area.48 It has conducted an annual promotional
campaign since 1936 whereby coupon books are distributed to its
customers for the nominal sum of ten cents per book. The
coupons entitle them to a price reduction of one-third or more on
each item featured when the appropriate coupon is surrendered
upon making a purchase. Each supplier is charged at least $350
for each coupon-page advertising his product.47 Certain suppliers
also replace a percentage of the goods sold by Meyer during the
campaign at no charge, or by redeeming coupons in cash.4
refuse to deal. Discussed fully infra. See also D. BAum , THE RoBINsoN-
PATMAN Acr 53 (1964).
43 [The "indirect customer" doctrine] seems to stem from a fundamental
aim of the Robinson-Patman Act to protect buyers' competitors from
the evil effects of direct or indirect price discrimination. . . . The
method chosen to reach this goal was to forbid sellers to make direct
or indirect discrimination in price between one purchaser or customer
and another, save in certain limited situations. American News Co. v.
F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
441d. at 110. Suppose, for example, that a supplier was giving allow-
ances to a favored direct-buyer and wished to avoid making allowances
available to its competitors. Instead of dealing directly with the purchaser,
it could insert a "dummy" wholesaler and consequently could avoid making
similar allowances available to non-favored competitors because, technically,
they would no longer be competing on the same functional level.
45F.T.C. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
46 It handles groceries, drugs, variety items, and a limited line of cloth-
ing. Its 1960 prospectus indicated that it made one-fourth of all retail
food sales in the Portland area and was the second largest seller of all
goods in that area. Id. at 344.
47 Meyer sold 138,700 books in 1957 and 121,270 in 1958. In 1957 it
made a "clear profit" of $13,870 on consumer purchases of the books. Id.
at 345.
48 This gave rise to a 2(a) violation which is not discussed here.
[ VOL. 43
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Initially, the Commission held that a supplier who grants
promotional allowances to direct-buying retailers must also make
them available to wholesalers whose retail customers compete with
the direct buyer.4 Discarding the "indirect purchaser" doctrine,
the Commission reasoned that the statutory purpose warranted
protection of an indirect-buying retailer even though he had no
direct dealings with his supplier.50
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part with respect to this con-
struction of 2(d) holding that the section only applied to customers
competing on the same functional level.5'
The Supreme Court, in attempting to reach a solution con-
sonant with the objectives of the Act, while remaining within its
restrictive framework, adopted what it considered a pragmatic
approach.5 2  It reversed the court of appeals and rejected the
measure adopted by the Commission of treating the wholesalers as
"competitors." Rather, it adopted the suggestion of a dissenting
Commissioner of treating the indirect-buying retailers as "cus-
tomers," even though they never dealt directly with the suppliers.
53
Thus, when a supplier gives allowances to a direct-buying retailer,
he must also make them available on comparable terms to those who
compete with the direct buyer in resales but who buy the products
through wholesalers.
The functional and theoretical problems presented are
numerous and somewhat disconcerting.
CRITICISMS
On first inspection one is confronted with the perplexing
realization that the Court has literally redefined "customer" in
terms of the Act. Although there is no definition propounded in
the legislation, the Commission, which was originally intended to
administer the Act,5 4 established one which became part of the
aforementioned delicate balance.
No longer need there be privity or a "course of dealing"
between the parties for one to be considered a "customer." As long
as a retailer who purchases through a wholesaler competes with a
direct buyer in resales, he is considered a "customer" of the
supplier.55 This is based on the rationale that a narrower con-
49 Fred Meyer, Inc., No. 7492 (Mar. 29, 1963).
10 See 390 U.S. 341, 347 (1968).51 Fred Meyer, Inc. v. F.T.C., 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966).52 See 390 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1968).
53 Nor was there any "course of direct dealing" or control exerted by
the supplier.54 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 355 (1968).
SGId. at 352.
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struction ". . . would be diametrically opposed to Congress' clearly
stated intent to improve the competitive position of small
retailers ... " 56 Large direct-buying retailers who also assume
the wholesaling function would be protected from any discrimina-
tory allowances which might otherwise be granted to their direct-
buying competitors, while the smaller retailers who buy indirectly
would not.
The immediate pragmatic objection to the decision is that to a
large extent it will be impossible for the business executive to make
necessary decisions with respect to this section. For years he
had been closely following the decisions, trying to determine piece-
meal the Act's meaning.5 7  The precedents regarding definitions of
"customer" were largely confirmed by the 1960 Guides which were
meant to aid in this effort. The decision is a "wrench in the
works," to say the least. No longer can there be executive
reliance on Commission pronouncements. Rather, the businessman
must now follow each and every case through the courts awaiting
some new interpretation which might well take the form of a
Divine Revelation. (And beware he who attempts to anticipate!)
On closer inspection the objection becomes more fundamental.
As was stated by Baum, ".... the right to refuse to deal, the
statutory embodiment of the 'Colgate Doctrine' permeates the entire
Robinson-Patman Act. One who is not a customer cannot claim
the allowance or services which flow from sections 2(d) and(e)."s
56 Id. What about small suppliers who must now make allowances avail-
able to a much greater number of purchasers? See discussion infra.
5 Cut loose from original legislative objectives, recent proceedings reach
out into all sectors of the economy to strike down business practices
previously thought competitive. Decisions superimpose ambiguities on
uncertain statutory language.
Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patinan, 60 YAsLE L.J. 929, 972 (1951).
It remains difficult for any seller to determine the legal bounds of
what is proportional, or when there is proper availability as a written
or oral offer, or what are appropriately shared costs and credits in
cooperative advertising and promotion.
Austern, Isn't Thirty Years Enough?, 30 A.B.A. AN=rr =us- SEcrroz 23(1966).
The cause of the trouble is the [Robinson-Patman] Act itself, which
is vague and general in its wording and which cannot be translated
with assurance into any detailed set of guiding yardsticks.
Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 941 n.66 (1951), citing Clark, J., in
Ruberoid Co. v. F.T.C., CCH TRAm REG. REP. '48-'51 Dec. 62, 847(2d Cir. 1951).
58D. BAUM, THE ROBINSoN-PATmAN Acr 53 (1964).
[ VOL. 43
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The "Colgate Doctrine" is simply that:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
[Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader
or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal.19
There was certainly no finding that either Fred Meyer, Inc. or
his supplier were attempting to "create or maintain a monopoly."
Therefore, the decision is clearly contrary to the "Colgate
Doctrine," for the Court is, in effect, directing that the supplier
deal with the indirect-buying retailers with whom he never before
had any transactions. The possible counter argument that he will
not necessarily have to deal with the retailer has no validity.60
Even if the supplier need only have contacts directly with the
wholesaler, to order that the allowance be passed on to the retailer
is to create a transaction between the two.61  Furthermore it is
stated in the Act itself:
. . . That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged
in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting
their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint
of trade.6 2
Although this provision appears in section 2(a) there is no reason
to suspect that it is not applicable to section 2(d). As was often
stated in the legislative history, section 2(d) was enacted to pre-
vent disguised 2(a) violations,63 and, therefore, the sections are so
closely related that what is basic to (a) cannot be denied (d)
when the purpose of the clause in question is so central to the
Act in toto. Similarly, in Bird & Son, Inc.,6 4 the Commission, con-
cerned with a 2(a) question, stated that the Act
does not purport to interfere with the right of the seller to
select his customers. He may discriminate in the choice of his
59United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).600ne such argument would be that the supplier need only grant the
allowance to the wholesaler, requiring that it be passed on to the retailer.
There are important Sherman Act implications in this argument which
will be discussed fully infra.61 This is not being overly technical for a dealing does not require a
face-to-face confrontation, but may be carried on through intermediaries.
62Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §3(a) (1964). See also C.
EDwARuns, TnH PRicE DIscmumxIAToN LAw 40 (1959). Edwards states
that this provision was included to make sure that certain practices were
not to be regarded as unlawfully discriminatory.
63 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
6425 F.T.C. 548 (1937).
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customers. Not until there is a discrimination in price among those
chosen does section 2(a) of the Act have any application. 65
Applying this reasoning to section 2(d), the supplier may dis-
criminate in his choice of customers. If the court then finds that
an allowance was not proportionally granted to one who is a cus-
tomer (or must be considered a customer because of a course of
direction dealing) there is a 2(d) violation. It is not sufficient to
first make a determination that all those who compete with respect
to the products involved are "customers," even though remotely
related in the distributive chain, and through this device find that
a violation has been committed.
The repudiation of the "indirect-purchaser" doctrine, although
coming not as a complete surprise, directs new attention to the
weaknesses of section 2(d) and the Act generally. Undoubtedly
there is something basically wrong with a statute which neces-
sitates reliance on such a doctrine to accomplish its successful
implementation." Fundamental weaknesses aside, however, it was
earlier pointed out that the doctrine was, in fact, a significant
factor in a delicate balance. While on the one hand the non-
favored indirect purchaser must be protected, on the other, one
having no contacts with the supplier cannot be considered a "cus-
tomer." 67 The Court felt that such an analysis resulting in a
doctrine requiring some direct dealing was giving too narrow a
construction to the statute.68 Thus, it is unnecessary to find any
direct dealing unless the doctrine is being used ". . . to pierce a
supplier's unrealistic claim that a reseller favored by him is actual-
ly the customer of an intermediate distributor." 69 The ramifica-
tions of such a holding warrant closer examination.
Exempting the requirement of direct dealing places a tre-
mendous burden on suppliers. Suppose, for example, that a small
supplier grants an allowance to a direct-buying retailer for the
promotion of a particular product which it also sells to a number
of wholesalers. Each wholesaler might conceivably distribute the
product to hundreds of independent retailers. The supplier is in a
position where he must make the allowance available to each and
every indirect-buyer who resells the product. The financial bur-
den on a small supplier could be overwhelming. Moreover, the
functional problem of determining who the resellers are and in
what proportions they are to receive the allowances approaches
65 Id. at 553.
66Supra note 43.
67 Supra note 41.
68 390 U.S. 34,, 354 (1968).
689 Id. at 353.
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a magnitude which becomes ludicrous.7 0  It requires of the sup-
plier an advanced information feedback system which large firms
have difficulty maintaining within their own corporate structures.
In the final analysis, the small supplier will find it easier to simply
avoid giving any promotional allowances, while the large supplier
who can better afford the increased costs and responsibilities will
be able to continue. Needless to say, the effect on competition
and the small supplier will not be salutary.
Prior to the decisions in question a definite trend had de-
veloped away from the former reliance on functional levels and
labels as determinative factors of the Act's applicability.71 More-
over, the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws indicated that the ". . . proliferation
of modern marketing units defies neat nomenclature and descriptive
labels." 72 The decision of the Commission 73 was in line with
this trend. It was found that the wholesalers did in fact com-
pete with Fred Meyer, Inc., and, therefore, they would have to be
granted the allowances; not the retailers to whom they resold.
Functional labels were disregarded with good reason. Fred Meyer,
Inc. assumed the wholesale distributive function, as well as the
retail; therefore, it did technically compete with the wholesalers
and such a finding was entirely reasonable. The Court, however,
resurrected the old artificial barrier and said that Meyer and the
wholesalers were on different functional levels and thus could not
compete. Instead of treating Meyer as a wholesaler, which was
feasible, it elected to treat the indirect-buyers as "customers,"
which they were not. This renewal of the importance of functional
levels and labels merely serves to retard progressive enforcement
of the Act and encourages the resort to an unrealistic rationale.
The Court's reliance on Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as the means to enforce its finding of a 2(d)
violation deserves attention. As was mentioned earlier, although
section 2(d) was intended to minimize the advantages of large
buyers, it only deals with sellers. Furthermore, the only section
7 0 Also, as Justice Harlan points out in his dissent, "the supplier
risks treble damages if his guess as to what is even handed treatment turns
out to be erroneous." Id. at 362.
7'See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959); F.T.C.
v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); F.T.C.
v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
72 REPoRT OF THE ATTOaRvY GENmER's NAT'L CoMM. TO SruY THE
ANra'usT LAWS 204 (1955).
73 63 F.T.C.
74 Supra note 16.
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of the Act which is aimed at buyers is section 2(f) which pro-
vides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a dis-
crimination in price which is prohibited by this section."5
Unfortunately this section is concerned only with discriminations
in price and not promotional allowances.70 Consequently, nothing
in the Act focuses on the inducement of a violation or receipt
of unlawful payments under 2(d) by a buyer.77 As to why such
an omission was made there has been a great deal of debate, but
the general consensus seems to indicate that it was inadvertant.s
In order to compensate for this defect, resort has been made to
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 7 D which pro-
vides that
[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
In Grand Union v. FTC,80 the Second Circuit stated that the
Federal Trade Commission Act
. . . was intended to give the Commission the power to 'hit at every
trade practice, then existing or thereafter contrived, which restrained
competition or might lead to such restraint if not stopped in its
incipient stages.' s'
75Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (f) (1964).7SSee C. EDwARDs, THE PRICE DlscmiNATiON LAW 486-87 (1959);
F. RowE, PRICE DIscaiixATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
432-33 (1962).
77In two cases, Miami Wholesale Drug Company (Dkt. 3377), and
Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Company (Dkt. 4957), the Commission pro-
ceeded against buyers who had received advertising allowances, but found
that these were subterfuge arrangements for violations of 2(a). See C.
EDWARDS, THE PRICE DIscImINATiO N LAw 487 (1959).7SAmerican News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 92, 94(2d Cir. 1964). See Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), New York State Bar
Ase'n Robinson-Patman Act Symposium 55, 61 (CCH 1946). But see
Judge Moore's dissent in Grand Union v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 92, 101 (2d
Cir. 1962).79 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964). See F. RowE, PUcE DIscRimiNATION
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 432-36 (1962).
80300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962) dealt with a cooperative advertising ar-
rangement between Grand Union, a group of its suppliers and an adver-
tising firm.
SlId. at 98, citing F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, Inc., 333 U.S. 683, 693
(1948).
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Consequently it affirmed the finding of the Commission that
it is the duty of the Commission to 'supplement and bolster' Section 2
of the amended Clayton Act by prohibiting under Section 5 practices
which violate the spirit of the amended Act .... 112
Thus, the buyer's inducement of a 2(d) violation and knowing
receipt of the benefits thereof was an "unfair method of com-
petition" under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.8 3
Moreover, in the Ainerican, News case, the court indicated that
a buyer must see first whether payments are offered or otherwise
made available to his competitors.8 4
Strongly dissenting in both Grand Union and American News,
Judge Moore pointed out in the latter that this holding would
be detrimental to the bargaining position of buyers.8  Since a
buyer could not accept better terms unless he first inquired of
the seller as to whether the terms were made available to others
and then verified any such assurance, the magnitude of this burden
would probably preclude the buyer from even asking for better
terms. He further points out that there was possibly good reason
for not extending the provisions of section 2(d) to buyers:
[A] seller is in a unique position to know whether he is giving pro-
portionally equal allowances to his customers. The customers could
not possibly have such facts available.8 6
This reasoning seems to be much more solidly based than that
of the majority. Indeed, more discussion and comment is needed
from the Court. 7  What is truly disturbing in light of these
developments is the fact that the Fred Meyer Court relied on
section 5 without any discussion of the issue whatsoever. Thus,
criticism is well-directed on this point.
82F.T.C. Dkt. 6973, at 10-11 (emphasis added).
83Grand Union v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). Accord, American
News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824(1962). See also R.H. Macy & Co. v. F.T.C., 326 F.2d 445, 447 (1964),
where the court stated:
[w]here activity runs counter to the public policy declared in the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Commission has the
power to suppress it as an unfair method of competition.
Citing Fashion Originators Guild of America v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457, 463(1941).84American News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104, 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824 (1962).
85Id. at 112.
so Id. at 113.
87 See F. Rowa, PRIcE DIscimnrAmow UNDR THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
Acr 435 (1962).
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The functional problems which will undoubtedly arise through
the implementation of this construction of section 2(d) are of some
significance. The Commission's decision 88 raised serious doubts about
this construction. Rowe pointed out that although the decision
had established the wholesaler's eligibility for promotional allow-
ances it did not specify the obligations of the wholesaler
".. including any potential duty of 'passing on' the benefit
to his retail customers who are the prime object of the FTC's
concern." 89 So too, Mr. Austern prophetically indicated that the
Commission's decision seemed "headed for collision" with the
Sherman Act.90 The decision of the Court assumes an even more
precarious position; it leaves two alternatives for compliance by
suppliers, both of which are on the collision course described
above.
Firstly, one method which the Court suggests 91 is for suppliers
to impose restrictions on wholesalers to insure that the allowances
are passed on to retailers. The supplier would have to establish
maximum resale prices to prevent the wholesaler from absorbing
the allowances. As justice Harlan points out in his dissent, this
would involve a conflict with the resale price maintenance prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act.92 Under Albrecht v. Herald Co.,93 resale
price fixing is a per se violation of antitrust law whether done by
agreement or combination. Specifically, agreements to fix maxi-
mum resale prices as well as minimum prices are illegal.95 In
88 63 F.T.C.
89 F. RowF; PRICE DIscRmINATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSoN-PATmAIx Acr
(1962), (Supp. 1964) at 89-90.90 Austern, Ist't Thirty Years Enough?, 30 A.B.A. ANTnTRUST SErol'T
23 (1966).
91390 U.S. 341, 358 (1968). The Court suggests that
[t]he supplier takes responsibility, under the rules and guides pro-
mulgated by the Commission for the regulation of such practices, for
seeing that the allowances are made available to all who compete
in the resale of his product.
But how can a supplier take responsibility based on those rules when the
Court itself ignores them?
92Id. at 361, citing Albrecht v. Herald, 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
93390 U.S. 145 (1968).
94Id. at 151, citing United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305 (1956); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340
U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150(1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
95 Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences
in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by substi-
tuting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of
the competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers
to compete and survive in that market. Competition, even in a single
product, is not cast in a single mold.
Id. at 152-53.
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Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons,"" holding illegal a combina-
tion of liquor distributors to set maximum resale prices, the Court
said that agreements to set maximum prices "... . no less than those
to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judg-
ment." 97 The basic problem created by any such price restric-
tion is that transactions which might have otherwise taken
place are foreclosed. 93  Other vices of such restrictions are
numerous.99 Another consideration is that of determining what the
maximum price will be. A supplier is in no position to set a
wholesaler's prices for the mere fact that he cannot know the
intricacies of each individual firm's pricing policies and the factors
which determine prices. If he decides to peg a specific amount
onto the wholesaler's own price the probability exists that the
wholesaler will cut his prices to compensate for this stated increase.
A likely argument by the Court would be that such resale
price maintenance is necessary to protect the small retailer and
therefore not illegal. This argument is necessarily precluded by the
Court's own statements. It rejected the reasoning of the court of
appeals in Kiefer-Stewart that a price ceiling was necessary to
protect the public,-00 and in Albrecht it stated unequivocally that
[t]he assertion that illegal price fixing is justified because it blunts
the pernicious consequences of another distributive practice is un-
persuasive. If . . . the economic impact . . . was such that the
public could be protected only by otherwise illegal price fixing itself
injurious to the public, the entire scheme must fall under Section 1
of the Sherman Act.'0 '
The second alternative for compliance is that the supplier by-
pass the wholesaler altogether and make the allowances directly
90340 U.S. 211 (1951).
97 Id. at 213, cited in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).
98Comment, Antitrust--Newspaper's Maintenance of Fixed Maximum
Retail Price Held Not to be Combination in Restraint of Trade or Com-
nzcrce, 47 B.U.L. REv. 274, 288 (1967).99 Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish
services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer or
to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for
which they are willing to pay. Maximum price fixing may channel
distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers
who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition.
Moreover, if the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme
is nearly always the fixed maximum price, the scheme tends to acquire
all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices.
Albrecht v. Herald, 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
100 Id.
20 Id. at 154.
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available to the retailers. As Justice Harlan again points out in his
dissent, this alternative too is impracticable. 10 2 A single large
supplier might deal with hundreds of wholesalers who in turn deal
with hundreds of small retailers. This factor might make it less
than feasible for the supplier to deal directly with the retailers.
However, there exists the distinct possibility that to avoid violation
of section 2(d) large suppliers might find it increasingly desirable
to integrate forward and absorb the wholesaling functions themselves.
In such a capacity they would then find it easier to administer the
allowances directly. This is not at all unlikely as the pressure to
avert the prospect of treble damage actions mounts, since the
logistical costs would probably be considerably less expensive. Here
again there exist Sherman Act complications, as any such direct
dealing or forward integration could be considered a conspiracy in
restraint of the wholesalers. 0 3 Also, mention must again be made
of the fact that suppliers will find it quite difficult to determine
what is proportional. 04
In addition to the enforcement problems there are many
theoretical problems viewed from the economic perspective. The
Robinson-Patman Act itself is fraught with such problems, and they
must be considered generally along with the specific ones inherent
in the Fred Meyer decision.
The fundamental purpose of all antitrust law is to protect
competition. Competition per se is valuable because theoretically
it guarantees the correct price adjustments in a free market
economy. However, in an advanced market and even in an optomis-
tic one the effect of competition is to wipe out marginal firms. To
allow true competition to take its natural course we would have to
adhere to the laissez-faire policy advocated by Adam Smith. Of
course, such an attitude is impractical in an advanced economy.
All forms of price discrimination have some deleterious conse-
quences. But to the extent that discriminatory practices are curtailed,
marginal firms are preserved at the expense of the more efficient
large firm. 05  "Moreover, economists do not condemn discrimina-
tion per se. On the contrary, they find it contributes to an efficient
use of resources." 106
To elaborate further, a large firm grows because it is efficient.
The economies of scale make it more efficient and enable it to
102390 U.S. 341, 361 (1968).
103 Id.
104 See discussion of "proportionality" .upra.
105 "The Act has a single unifying principle: to enforce discrimination
against the lower-cost buyer or the lower-cost method of distribution."
Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAir. L. Rlv.
3, 4 (1953).
100 Backnan, An Economist Looks at the Robinson-Patman Act, 17
A.B.A. ANTiThUST SEcrioNs 343, 345 (1960).
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grow larger. Because it can buy in large quantities it receives
certain discounts. These discounts are not considered discrimina-
tory because they are "cost justified." 107 However, the large firm
also receives promotional allowances which may or may not be
disguised price discriminations. These can never be "cost justified"
and are illegal per se unless they are made available on proportion-
ally equal terms to all the large firm's competitors.103 In effect,
this is rewarding the marginal firm for its inefficiencies. The
avowed purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is to protect the
small firm regardless of efficiencies,109 and this is where it runs
directly counter to other antitrust law, the purpose of which is to
protect competition, not competitors." 0
We must examine the true objectives. We do not want to
protect competition merely for competition's sake, but because of
the salutory effects in a free market economy. Thus, the counter-
vailing forces will adjust through competition so as to establish
optimum efficiency in the economy, letting the marginal firms fall
by the wayside"211 and resulting in lower prices to the ultimate
'
07 See F. RowE, PRIcn DIscluimNATIoN UNDER THE RoBInSoN-PATAtAN
ACT ch. 10 (1962); C. EDwAms, THE PlucE Discanu NATOi"o LAW cl. 18(1959).
lUs It is no defense to a charge of unlawful discrimination in the pay-
ment of an allowance or the furnishing of a service for a seller to show
that such payment, service, or facility, could be justified through savings
in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery. GUIDES. See also Corn
Ref. Prods. Co. v. F.T.C., 166 F.2d 211, 219 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd,
324 U.S. 726 (1945). Accord, R H. Macy & Co. v. F.T.C, 326 F.2d
445, 450 (2d Cir. 1964); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. F.T.C., 156 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1946); United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co.,
107 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); D. BAuU, THE ROBiNSON-PATMAN
Acr 50 (1964); C. EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DiscmrNAAmoN LAW 164 (1959).
109 According to Rep. Patman, ". . . it is one of the first duties of
Government to protect the weak against the strong and prevent men from
injuring one another. . . ." 80 CoNG. REc. 3447 (1936).
1 02To the extent that the Robinson-Patman Act inhibits price and serv-
ice competition generally, it may often conflict with the objective of the
antitrust laws of protecting and fostering vigorous competition for the benefit
of the public (and not for the benefit of the individual competitors). The
Supreme Court has indicated that, where Congress has left the courts
free to make the determination, this conflict is to be resolved in favor of
the "broader policies" of the antitrust laws. Automatic Canteen Co. v.
F.T.C., 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
"'To the extent that competition is effective, it must hurt someone.
Presumably, those who are the less efficient and render the poorer
service are hurt and hence on balance the economy benefits from
vigorous competition. Clearly, hurting competitors and hurting com-
petition are not synonymous.
Backman, An Economist Looks At the Robinson-Patman Act, 17 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SEcTIoNs 343, 352, citing Boles, Jr., Marketing and the Robinson-
Patman Act, PRocEm iNGs OF THE 1958 INsT. oN ANTITRUST LAws, 12-13
(195S).
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consumer. To protect the small firm just because it is small is
illogical and, from a pragmatic viewpoint, harmful to the market
mechanism.11 2 Furthermore, the Act is aimed specifically at firms
which are the epitome of efficiency in the market, the integrated
chain store. In evaluating the integrated firm, Professor Adelman
stated that
successful integration, vertical or horizontal, consists in the saving of
overhead, and results in doing a given job more cheaply. Thus it
is like any superior method of doing business in that it permits the
more efficient firm to displace its rivals. This is of course the way
that competition is supposed to increase output and lower prices .... 113
The vice of integration, therefore [from the point of view of the
Robinson-Patman Act], is its superior efficiency, for that makes it
impossible for nonintegrated concerns to be 'able to compete.' 114
He characterized the "displacement of inferior by superior business
methods" as the "essence of competition." 115
The true objective of antitrust policy should necessarily be
the protection of the public. "The [Robinson-Patman Act] ...
strikes directly at the primary interest of the public by denying
consumers the assurance of obtaining the benefits of the lowest
prices, the most efficient methods and equipment can bring about
under free, but fair, competition." 316 In the long run the con-
sumers are the ones who are being hurt most by this statute.2
1 7
The Fred Meyer decision, in broadening the reach of the Act,
is helping to proliferate the evil. This can be seen by examining
the Kay Windsor case.:1 s There, a dress manufacturer granted
advertising allowances to some customers without making them
available to all others competing in the distribution of the goods.
The Commission held that a retailer making purchases through a
purchasing syndicate was a "customer" under the "indirect pur-
chaser" doctrine. 19  Directing attention to the dress industry ,
20 it
112 I have never found a situation in which an order or a treble-damage
judgment grounded on this statute resulted in any greater volume
of production at lower prices for the ultimate consumer.
Austern, Isn't Thirty Years Enough?, 30 A.B.A. AxNrMUST SEcmoN 24(1966).
'112Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HA.v. L. Rxv. 27,
48 (1949).
214 Id. at 53.
115 Id. at 50.
1 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 27 (1937).
11 The consumers owe no business a living; laws like the instant one
intended to preserve any business at the expense of the consumer will
in the end prove harmful. Id.
118 Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89 (1954).
119 Id. at 96.
120See C. EDwARDs, THE PRIcE DISCRImITATION LAw 180-82 (1959).
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is evident that advertising plays a central role in all stages of
distribution. From the manufacturer's point of view, his sales to
small stores are facilitated if he can show that prestige stores are
carrying his line.121 Consequently, manufacturers compete for ad-
vertising by influential stores, and offer this advertising
selectively. 22
The Commission found a violation of section 2(d). The prob-
lems engendered by this decision are readily apparent. An over-
abundance of advertising might make the dresses seem too common
to be desirable.1223 After Windsor's discontinuance of allowances,
interviews with customers indicated they had been adversely
affected by the decision.124  The small customers admitted that
advertising of a particular dress by a large store generated sales
for the smaller stores; moreover, some of them based their orders
on dresses which were so advertised. Furthermore, small customers
were reluctant to obtain proportional allowances because they were
impracticable.125  One customer suggested the change in policy
reduced his willingness to buy Windsor dresses. 2 6
The Windsor case is important here because it demonstrates
what actually happens as the result of such a decision. We see at
first hand the economic consequences. Although it can be argued
that the dress industry is totally unrelated to the food industry,
the basic problems resulting from such a decision or order are
basically the same. The Fred Meyer decision would have much
more widespread consequences, however, because of the size of
the class of "customers" it creates.
Another important point which has been conspicuously
neglected in discussions of section 2(d) and relevant cases, is the
fact that although the Act is aimed at the protection of the small
retailer the cases under section 2(d) and especially Fred Meyer
serve to undermine the position of the small supplier. Advertising
is vital to the small supplier and his limited budget places him in a
precarious position with respect to his large competitors. Fred
Meyer says that whenever such a supplier makes an advertising
allowance to one retailer he must make it available to all retailers
who compete in the distribution of his product. Spreading his
allowances thin in such a manner might make it impractical for
him to advertise at all. As Edwards puts it,
1211d. at 181.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 182.
125 A small buyer cannot claim a small promotional allowance because
he does not find it practicable to advertise by brand name a dress of
which he may have bought only six copies. Id.
12GId. at 204.
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[t]his requirement necessarily impairs the opportunity for the producer
to limit his promotional budget by centering his campaign on certain
strategic points, to focus his promotion on the prestige of particular
distributors, and to experiment locally with new types of promotion.
1 27
His advertising having been seriously curtailed, the position of the
small supplier is truly precarious. Indeed, Fulda suggests that he
may go bankrupt in the process of trying to make proportionate
payments to all his customers.
2 S
The economic consequences of the Act and the instant case
are best summarized by Rowe:
Recent cases highlight the dangerous effects of a statute that regu-
lates a competitive economy but perverts the economics of competi-
tion. Because the universals of the statute have swallowed up origi-
nal aims, decisions strike into all sectors of the industry. No coherent
pattern of business regulation emerges. The cases' undercurrent of
protecting some competitors, however, increasingly conflicts with public
policy of competition itself.1 29
Conclusion
The Robinson-Patman Act undoubtedly has its remunerative
features. As a deterrent to firms which would otherwise utilize
superior market positions to effectuate monopolistic practices, it is
valuable in protecting competition. Specifically, the salubrious
quality of section 2(d) is that it forces firms to make public their
advertising practices, thus discouraging sinister schemes. Surely
small firms must be protected from monopolies, but not from com-
petition.130 Robinson-Patman apparently is trying to shelter small
firms from anything which might be detrimental whether the net
effect be beneficial to the long-range economy or not.
Advocates of this position base their arguments on the
necessity of protecting the entrepreneur whose "ingenuity and
daring" is essential to our system.'3 Although this may be true
to an extent, there is no reason why they should not be subjected
to the natural influences of the competitive system. If the firm is
227 Id
12s Fulda, Food Distribution in the U.S., 99 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1051, 1089
(1951).
129 Rowe, Price Discrination., Competition, and Confusion: Another
Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 942 (1951).
3O But see Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 I-iAv. L. Rav.
27, 77 (1949).
'
8 1 Van Cise, No Thirty Years Are Not Enough, 30 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 28, 30 (1966).
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truly efficient, it will survive because its own inherent advantages
will balance those of the large firm. Moreover, today the
ingenuity comes not from small firms but from large firms whose
extensive research and development departments produce the
significant technological innovations.
Departing from the realm of generalities and focusing on the
instant case, how can the sheltering of a small retail grocer from
the advantages of a large chain be justified? What form of
"ingenuity and daring" does this small grocer possess? The
answer simply is that he might carry products and perform
specialized services which the large store cannot. If this is true he
will be able to compete successfully on his own. If it is not, he
does not deserve governmental coddling. Although this economic
Darwinism might seem harsh, it is a fundamental fiber in the
method of competition upon which our free market system is based.
During the 1930's the small firm did embody daring entre-
preneurial qualities. Today, however, elements of our economic
system have changed almost beyond recognition. In tracing the
development of the Act, Professor G. Alexander feels that
[w]hat may have resulted is an act which perpetuates an outdated
economic distribution system for the benefit of unnecessary inter-
mediaries and simultaneously, in the name of a competitive economy,
perpetuates the inefficient whose eradication is the sine qua non of
free competition. 132
The implementation of the inconsistent and vague provisions
of the Act, particularly section 2(d), leads to a good deal of
judicial legislation. The Fred Meyer Court, confronted with the
task of enforcing the most confusing section of the Act, took it
upon itself to use a definition which it considered necessary to
reach what it perceived as a desired end. Nothing serves to
confuse an issue more than a court or administrative agency taking
it upon itself to discern what the legislature intended. In attacking
such judicial legislation by the Commission, Professor Handler
expressed it thusly:
Congress vested the Commission with a broad and flexible mandate.
But it did not endow it with the power to legislate. In the final
analysis a democracy cannot permit its laws to be rewritten by ad-
ministrative agencies or the executive. Where administration discloses
defects or limitations in the laws drafted by Congress with which the
'132Alexander, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, A Deus
Ex Machina in the Tragic Interpretation of the Robinsmo-Patinan Act,
12 SYmAcusE L. Rxv. 317, 323 (1961).
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techniques of interpretation are unable to cope, the remedy is to
request supplemental legislation from the elected representatives of the
people who, under our system of government, are the final arbiters
of national policy. This has been the settled practice in the anti-
trust field where numerous legislative changes have been made over
the years. 1
33
Needless to say, such a characterization applies equally to the
rewriting of laws by the courts. Such practices merely serve to
magnify inconsistencies, make it harder for the Commission to
perform its function, and leave businessmen in the dark. A better
method would be to leave enforcement entirely to the Commission.
Inequitable decisions would ultimately result in supplemental legis-
lation to modify the Act.
From a perplexing Act have come confusing interpretations,
but nothing appears to have been more off track than the Fred
Meyer decision. The Court accomplished no more than did the
Commission in enforcing the objectives of section 2(d), but reached
the same result in a way which added unnecessary complications in
view of the fact that similar results had been achieved by a more
direct route in earlier cases. It would have been more logical
to treat the wholesaler in the case as a competitor of Fred Meyer
on that particular level. In the final analysis, however, even the
Commission's decision would have been unsatisfactory in light of
the economic ramifications discussed earlier. These indicate quite
clearly that the decision has gone too far in its interpretation of
section 2(d).
It would be exceedingly difficult, if not futile, to attempt to
surmise the true reasoning of the Court. What is beyond doubt,
however, is the fact that this judicial tour de force 134 has given a
broader interpretation to an already broad statute. 35 It has in-
creased its scope to a breadth beyond the visions of its founders
and stretched it so thin as to approach functional insignificance.
This type of decision will lead to similar discordant interpretations
of the Act by the Commission and lower courts. The Act was
intended to be flexible, but when rubber is stretched too far it
breaks. The true test may possibly be at hand.
'33American News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104, 114 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962), citing Handler, Review of Antitrust Develop-
ments, The Record, Association of the Bar, New York City, Vol. 17, No.
7 at 408.
'34 390 U.S. 341, 359 (1968).
135 Rep. Utterback, Chairman of the Senate-House Conferees, character-
ized the prohibitions of the bill as intentionally broad. 80 CONG. REc.
9418 (1936).
[ VOLe. 43
